He has the authority!
What did He do with it? The Name of Jesus works. There is far more power wrapped up in this one Name than you may even realize. Below are four times when you should use the Name of Jesus. You are healed! But you have to take your health by force and take it by faith. Every sickness and disease has a name—the flu is a name, cancer is a name, heart disease is a name. Every name must bow to the Name of Jesus.
In his book Ever Increasing Faith, Smith Wigglesworth told a story about a man who had been bedridden and was in desperate need of healing. He sent for a group of his friends who were faith-filled people, asking them to pray the prayer of faith over him. So, they left—discouraged. At first, as they whispered, nothing seemed to happen. As they began to see this manifestation, their whisper turned into shouting.
As they were shouting the Name—that powerful Name—the man got up from his bed and got dressed. They had started out by praying in faith for the healing of this man—but their eyes were on the man and his condition the whole time. When they changed their focus and fixed all their attention on the Name of Jesus, their faith took hold of the power that is in His Name. When you use the Name of Jesus, Satan backs off. He has no choice. The only thing he can do is try to deceive you into believing something other than what the Word says.
The Bible tells us to give him no place. Instead, learn to be bold. It is the easiest thing in the world to get people saved when you get them healed first. Discover the power of the Anointing! Check out this special product offer. Just like every sickness has a name—lack is a name. And it covers more than money. Any area where you are in lack—peace in your family, joy in your spirit, finances—every name in that category has to bow to the Name of Jesus.
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Everything you read in Deuteronomy 28 that is under the curse of the Law, is lack, and it is of the devil. You have been redeemed from everything under the curse. By using the Name of Jesus when the devil comes to steal from you. So, when lack tries to come into your family, rebuke it. Jesus came that I might have life and have it more abundantly.
Stand your ground in every area. Revelation says the Name of Jesus is the Word of God!
Criticism of atheism
Well, God never told you to give the devil a fair shot either—He said use the Name of Jesus on him. But you have authority over every one of them. You spirit of rebellion, drugs, alcohol whatever it is , I break your power over my child, my spouse, my family.
I forbid you to operate in his or her life anymore.
I take by force what belongs to me and that includes my children and my family. You see, they were using a Name that they had no right to use. They could have used it. All they had to do was accept Jesus. They realized it was the Name that was getting things done, but they were not using it as their right.
4 Times When You Should Use the Name of Jesus - Kenneth Copeland Ministries Blog
When you are born again, and you have faith in the Name—there is no situation too great for that Name. But you have to take what belongs to you by force.
Be forcible in the spirit and force him out. And do it with the Name above all names. His entire profession is steal, kill and destroy.
For what matters is not whether there is some evidence relative to which it is unlikely that theism is true. What matters is whether theism is improbable relative to our total evidence. The question then is whether the appropriate revision of the first substantive premise is plausible. That is, do we have good reason for thinking that the following statement is true:. A Draper-style argument is one type of indirect inductive argument from evil. It is important to notice, however, that in formulating an indirect inductive argument from evil, one need not proceed along the route that Draper chooses.
If one explains the fact that the world contains an impressive mixture of desirable and undesirable states of affairs by the hypothesis that the creator of the world was an omnipotent, omniscient, and indifferent deity, then nothing more needs to be added. By contrast, if one wants to explain the mixed state of the world by the hypothesis that the creator of the world was an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect deity, one needs to postulate the existence of additional, morally significant properties that lie beyond our ken, and ones, moreover, that are so distributed that the mixed appearance does not correspond to what is really the case.
A theistic explanation is, accordingly, less simple than an indifferent deity explanation, and therefore, provided that one can argue that the a priori probability of the latter hypothesis is not less than that of the former, one can appeal to the greater simplicity of the latter in order to conclude that it has a higher posterior probability than the theistic hypothesis. It then follows, given that the two hypotheses are logically incompatible, that the probability of the theistic hypothesis must be less than one half.
We have just considered the Bayesian-style argument offered by Paul Draper. Let us now turn to another. The latter argument has been vigorously criticized by Plantinga , but Rowe has remained confident that the new argument is sound. Secondly, the object of the argument as a whole is to start out from some probabilistic assumptions, and then to move deductively, using only axioms of probability theory, to the following two conclusions:. Thirdly, in order to establish the first conclusion, Rowe needs only the following three assumptions:.
Fourthly, all three assumptions, interpreted as Rowe does, are surely eminently reasonable. As regards 2 , it certainly seems plausible, assuming that the existence of God is not logically necessary, that there is at least some non-zero probability that God does not exist, given our background knowledge.
But one can derive 2 , provided that one is willing to accept the not uncontroversial principle that only necessarily false propositions have a probability equal to zero. This principle is very plausible if one accepts the idea of infinitesimals. If one does not, one may hold that some contingent propositions have a probability equal to zero. Similarly, 3 also seems plausible, and here too one can derive 3 provided that one is willing to accept the principle that only necessarily false propositions have a probability equal to zero. Given assumptions 1 , 2 , and 3 , how does the argument for the first conclusion go?
In outline, one first uses 1 , 2 , and 3 to prove that. The key starting point is with the following theorem of probability theory Compare Draper, , :. This objection, however, is open to the following reply. The reason that I am justified in believing the proposition that either God does not exist or there is a pen in my pocket is that I am justified in believing that there is a pen in my pocket.
The proposition that either God does not exist or there is a pen in my pocket therefore does not represent the total evidence that I have. In section 3. All of the steps in that argument were deductive, except for the following crucial inference:. Essentially, there are three ways in which one might attempt to defend this inference.
One is by treating it as a case of instantial generalization. But as we saw in effect in section 3. A second approach is to view that inductive step as a matter of inference to the best explanation, and this is a more promising possibility. That approach would lead to an argument of the general form advanced by David Hume and Paul Draper, considered in section. There is, however, a third possibility, which is the focus of the present section. Underlying this approach are two general ideas: the first is that both induction via instantial generalization and inference to the best explanation abduction, the method of hypothesis, hypothetico-deductive method stand in need of justification; the second idea is that at the heart of such a justification will be the defense of an account of logical probability.
The fundamental idea, accordingly, is that the way to determine whether the inductive step that lies at the heart of the evidential argument from evil is sound is by bringing serious inductive logic—understood as a theory of logical probability—to bear upon the question. What is the appropriate theory of logical probability?